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ABSTRACT
Pakistan has an enduring friendship with China, and the two countries have long-
standing economic ties. There is an existing strong investment ﬂow between the two
countries, but the new Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) initiative and its off-
shoot China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will substantially increase the ﬂow
of Chinese investments in Pakistan. In the auspices of the SREB, China will ﬁnance its
companies to build a comprehensive regional transportation network in order to stim-
ulate economic growth and social development. The SREB Action Plan has a more
viable strategy for long-term development as compared with the existing regional eco-
nomic integration and development models, and the CPEC will undoubtedly create
numerous opportunities for the two countries. A scrutiny of the Chinese policies to
invest in Pakistan and the prevalent strong bilateral regime for investment promotion
and protection suggest that China–Pakistan investment relations reﬂect a move
towards much deeper economic integration. However, the various legal and policy ori-
entations of these Chinese projects reveal serious challenges in reaching the overall
vision, harnessing it with the intended objectives, and enhancing the legitimacy of its
implementation strategies. There is a need for proactive solutions for the transnational
problems that the CPEC and the SREB are going to generate.
KEYWORDS : Silk Road Economic Belt, China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, bilateral
investment treaty, free trade agreement, special economic zone
INTRODUCTION
The China–Pakistan friendship is frequently described as ‘all-weather’, ‘iron’, and
‘deeper than the Arabian Sea and higher than the Himalayas’.1 After the landmark
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Article
China–Pakistan Boundary Agreement in 1963,2 the two countries have strengthened
their friendship and cooperation with several joint agreements, memorandums of
understanding, and joint declarations covering a wide variety of areas including trade,
commerce, investment, energy, transport, and defence.3 Although the first formal
trade agreement was signed already in 1963,4 the contemporary China–Pakistan
trade regime started with the conclusion of a preferential trade arrangement (PTA)
in November 2003.5 In April 2005, the two countries concluded an Agreement on
the Early Harvest Programme, which was intended to provide the working frame-
work for the conclusion of a formal and all-encompassing China–Pakistan Free
Trade Agreement (FTA).6 On its implementation on 1 January 2006, the more
detailed Early Harvest Programme abolished the earlier trade-only PTA.7
The two countries quickly concluded the FTA in November 2006, which took
effect in July 2007.8 In February 2009, the Agreement on Trade in Services was con-
cluded in accordance with the policy framework set out in Article 83 of China–
Pakistan FTA.9 There is a strong perception that the establishment of a comprehen-
sive China–Pakistan free trade area has brought more opportunities for business
enterprises of the two countries.10 However, a study conducted by the Pakistan
Business Council in 2013 concluded that despite great potential, Pakistan has not yet
achieved the full benefits from its FTA with China.11 Although bilateral trade
between China and Pakistan has shown rapid growth, increasing from US $6.9
2 The text of the China–Pakistan Boundary Agreement was signed on 2 March 1963. The Agreement for-
mally delimited boundary between China’s Sinkiang and Pakistan’s Kashmir.
3 See the description of China–Pakistan Bilateral Relations on the official website of the Consulate-General
of the People’s Republic of China in Karachi <http://karachi.chineseconsulate.org/eng/zbgx/
t263901.htm> accessed 29 September 2015. For historical developments of the China–Pakistan trade
relations, see eg Samina Shabir and Reema Kazmi, ‘Economic Effects of the Recently Signed Pak-China
Free Trade Agreement’ Special Edition (September 2007) Lahore J Economics 173; Xu Wang, ‘Sino-
Pakistan Economic and Trade Relations: Status Quo and Challenges’ in Rong Wang and Cuiping Zhu
(eds), Annual Report on the Development of International Relations in the Indian Ocean Region (2014)
(Springer 2015) 97–130. See also Jafar Riaz Kataria and Anum Naveed, ‘Pakistan-China Social and
Economic Relations’ (2014) 29(2) South Asian Studies 395; Khawar Ghumman, ‘PML-N Puts All Its
MoUs in Chinese Basket’ The Dawn News (13 April 2015).
4 Shabir and Kazmi (n 3) 176.
5 Preferential Trade Arrangement between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, 3 November 2003. See Wang (n 3) 110.
6 See Agreement on the Early Harvest Programme for the Free Trade Agreement between the
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
(signed on 5 April 2005). (China–Pakistan Early Harvest Programme).
7 Ibid art 4.
8 Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (done at Islamabad on 24 November 2006 and entered into effect on
1 July 2007). (China–Pakistan FTA).
9 Agreement on Trade in Services between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (signed on 21 February 2009 and entered into force in
October 2009).
10 See eg Wang (n 3) 118; Hamid Mahmood and Muhammad Sabir, Trade Facilitation and Connectivity:
Perspective from China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Free Trade Agreement (FTA), Working Paper:
Forum for Research in Empirical International Trade (27 September 2014).
11 Pakistan Business Council, Preliminary Study on Pakistan and China Trade Partnership Post FTA, Trade
Study (2013) <http://www.pbc.org.pk/assets/pdf/21-Oct_Pakistan_China_Trade_Study_2013.pdf>
accessed 29 September 2015. However, this outcome of China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) is not exceptional as
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billion in 2007 to US $16 billion in 2014 with an annual growth of about 15.3 per
cent,12 Chinese imports from Pakistan are far less than its exports to Pakistan.13
Negotiations on the second stage of implementation of the China–Pakistan FTA are
currently in progress.14
In July 2013, during Prime Minister Sharif’s first official visit to China, the two
countries signed a memorandum of understanding on the China–Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC is part of President Xi’s Chinese Silk Road Economic
Belt (SREB) initiative with the eventual aim to enhance the connectivity of Pakistan
and China with all regional countries in Asia and Central Asia. The CPEC further
strengthens the two countries’ friendship and aims at a major overhaul of infrastruc-
ture including rail, roads, pipelines, ports, and fibre optic networks in a bid to ease
the energy crisis and increase Chinese investments in Pakistan.15 During Prime
Minister Sharif’s visit to Beijing in November 2014, Chinese companies and banks
pledged US $45.6 billion in energy and infrastructure projects related to the
CPEC.16
The most important feature of the CPEC plan is that the pledged money will not
be a loan to Pakistan but, rather, pure investment through Chinese companies that
will operate the projects as profit-making entities.17 The Chinese government and
state-owned commercial banks will instead loan funds to Chinese companies that
will invest in infrastructure projects in Pakistan as commercial ventures.18 The Silk
Road Fund Company Limited (SRFCL), a fund management company including
the China Exim Bank and the China Development Bank, was established in China in
December 2014 to extend investment and financing support to CPEC projects. The
SRFCL had initial funds of US $10 billion, which have now been raised to US $40
billion. According to Reuters, there will be around US $33.8 billion investments in
various energy projects and US $11.8 billion in infrastructure projects.19
This is a huge commitment by the Chinese government, which provides a promis-
ing opportunity for Pakistan to resolve its chronic energy shortage and develop its
failing infrastructure. There is no doubt that Chinese investments will accelerate
Pakistan’s growth.20 In addition to serving China’s strategic and energy security
the same has also been the case with other FTAs. See Kazim Alam, ‘Pakistan’s FTAs Have Borne No
Fruit So Far’ Express Tribune (10 August 2015).
12 Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Fourth Meeting of the Negotiations in the Second Stage of
China-Pakistan Free Trade Area Held in Beijing, Press Release (8 April 2015).
13 Pakistan Business Council (n 11).
14 MOFCOM (n 12).
15 See eg Finance Minister Ishaq Dar’s Keynote Address on Future of Pakistan Economy at Investment
Conference Islamabad’ (28 October 2014) <http://www.pakistanmission-un.org/invest
ment_conference.pdf> accessed 29 September 2015; Aarish U Khan, ‘Pak-China Economic Corridor:
The Hopes and Reality’ Spotlight: Institute of Regional Studies (January 2015).
16 See eg ‘China Commits $45.6 Billion for Economic Corridor with Pakistan’ Reuters (21 November
2014).
17 See eg ‘China Coming up with Investment, Not Loans: Asif (Khawaja Mohammad): Federal Minister for
Water and Power’ Express Tribune (10 September 2014).
18 Ibid.
19 ‘China Commits $45.6 Billion’ (n 16).
20 See eg Shahid Yusuf, Can Chinese FDI Accelerate Pakistan’s Growth? Growth Dialogue, George
Washington University Working Paper (February 2013).
Towards Greater Integration?  3
interests, these investments will benefit China in competing for the more profitable
parts of the supply chains where Chinese companies will ultimately have to find new
avenues for some of the low value-adding processing activities.21 These new and
existing investments require an efficient legal framework. The two countries con-
cluded a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) in 1989.22 The China–Pakistan BIT is still
in force, although the more recent China–Pakistan FTA has a comprehensive
chapter on investment.23 The existing bilateral legal framework for Chinese invest-
ments in Pakistan is, therefore, composed of both of these treaties.
The key question is this: how should we map out the China–Pakistan investment
relations historically as well as in the context of recent SREB and CPEC develop-
ments? The Indian perspective on the China–Pakistan relationship, in which India
has openly opposed the CPEC considering it to be a strategic defence alliance tar-
geted against India,24 the existing menace of terrorism and its headways to Xinjiang-
Uyghur separatism, and, more generally, concerns over the rise of Chinese economic
and political power from some corners of the globe have had much to say about the
investment relations between China and Pakistan. President Xi’s SREB initiative is
truly remarkable in this broader context, and it is likely to bring positive social and
economic change in the entire region. The SREB has created a new wave of Chinese
investments in the entire region, and it will likely counter the existing problems,
among others, of terrorism and separatism through economic development.
In the context of the CPEC and the renewed Chinese commitment to boost
investments in Pakistan, this article primarily analyses the legal regime, both national
and bilateral, of Chinese investments in Pakistan. The first part gives a detailed analy-
sis of the Chinese CPEC initiative in the broader SREB context. This analysis is
broadly framed on the legal and policy orientations of the SREB as compared to the
existing regional integration models and global development strategies. This part
also highlights some of the most important issues that require immediate attention
by both China and Pakistan for successful implementation of the CPEC specifically
as well as of the SREB generally. The second part of the article gives a detailed
description of the existing domestic legal regime in Pakistan for investment promo-
tion and protection and its implications for Chinese investors and investments. The
third part analyses and compares the provisions of the FTA and the BIT that the
two countries have concluded. The objective is to inform the existing and future
Chinese investors in Pakistan of their legal rights, potential risks, and available rem-
edies in case of loss or harm to their investments caused by their host. The fourth
part concludes the analysis confirming that although the SREB and the CPEC create
great economic development opportunities in the region and reflect a move towards
21 Ibid.
22 Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (signed on
12 February 1989, entered into force on 3 September 1990) (China–Pakistan BIT).
23 China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) ch IX.
24 The Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s statement that Indian prime minister has strongly
opposed China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project during his meeting with President Xi is
reported by all major media outlets in Pakistan. See eg ‘CPEC “unacceptable” to India, Modi Tells China’
Geo News (2 June 2015). See also Zafar Zulqurnain Sahi, ‘India’s Unhealthy Obsession with China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor’ Express Tribune (2 June 2015).
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much deeper economic integration, various legal and policy orientations of these
projects reveal serious challenges to vindicate the overall vision, harnessing the vision
with intended objectives, and enhancing the legitimacy of its implementation strat-
egies. There is a need for proactive solutions for the transnational problems that the
CPEC and the SREB are going to generate.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE SREB INITIATIVE: THE DAWN OF A NEW ERA
OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION?
Chinese strategists have been advocating that China should reach out to the west
through Central Asia and to the greater Middle East through Pakistan.25 President
Xi seized the idea and announced the SREB initiative in various statements, starting
with his speech in Kazakhstan in September 2013.26 In a later speech at the
Indonesian Parliament in October 2013, he introduced the idea of the twenty-first
century Maritime Silk Road to promote maritime cooperation and also proposed the
establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.27 In November 2013, the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China set the facilitation and con-
struction of the SREB and Maritime Silk Road as a primary milestone in pursuit of
its regional economic policy to accelerate the interconnection of infrastructure
among neighbouring countries.28 In March 2014, Premier Li stressed the need to
accelerate the construction of the ‘Belt and Road’ in the government’s work report.29
The report also promoted balanced development of the Bangladesh–China–India–
Myanmar Economic Corridor and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.30
After authorization by the State Council in March 2015, the first more coherent
and comprehensive vision and roadmap of the SREB has now emerged as an ‘Action
Plan’ issued by the National Development and Reform Commission in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China.31
The Action Plan explains that the SREB ‘aims to promote the connectivity of Asian,
European and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen
partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road, set up all-dimensional,
multi-tiered and composite connectivity networks, and realize diversified,
25 See eg Wang Jisi, ‘Marching Westwards’: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy’, International and
Strategic Studies Report, Center for International and Strategic Studies, No. 73 (7 October 2012). For some
analysis of Wang Jisi, see Andrew C Kuchins, ‘Why Washington Needs to Integrate the New Silk Road
with the Pivot to Asia’ (2013) 16 Asia Policy <first page?>.
26 See eg ‘Chronology of China’s “Belt and Road” Initiatives’ Xinhua (5 February 2015).
27 Ibid. In January 2014, 21 Asian countries willing to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
as founding members signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Establishing AIIB. As of 13 April
2015, there are 47 Prospective Founding Members (PFM) and 10 countries have applied for PFM. Hong
Kong joins the delegation of China in the negotiations. Belgium, Canada, and Ukraine are considering
joining the AIIB. Colombia, Japan, and the USA have no immediate intention to participate. North Korea
and Taiwan were rejected by China to join as a PFM. See <http://aiibank.org/yatouhang_02.html>
accessed 29 September 2015.
28 ‘Chronology of China’s “Belt and Road” Initiatives’ (n 26).
29 Li Keqiang, Report on the Work of the Government, Delivered at the Second Session of the Twelfth National
Peoples Congress (5 March 2014) 17.
30 Ibid.
31 ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road’ Xinhua (29 March 2015) <http://www.globalti
mes.cn/content/914373.shtml> accessed 29 September 2015.
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independent, balanced and sustainable development in these countries’.32 The terri-
torial reach of the SREB is explained as ‘bringing together China, Central Asia,
Russia and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the
Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and connecting China with
Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean’.33 The Maritime Silk Road ‘is
designed to go from China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the
Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to
the South Pacific in the other’.34
The detailed vision set out in the Action Plan is truly remarkable and
unprecedented and will effectively transform the entire region both economically
and socially. The Chinese government has strived to bolster the legitimacy of this
vision in accordance with international law. The Action Plan insists that the SREB
initiative is in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter as it upholds
the five fundamental principles of international engagement, namely, respect for sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs,
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.35 The Action Plan explains
that the SREB’s legal and functional modus operandi is based on the ‘market opera-
tion’. The SREB ‘will abide by market rules and international norms, give play to the
decisive role of the market in resource allocation and the primary role of enterprises,
and let the governments perform their due functions’.36
There are two likely benefits of this modus operandi. First, the market-based
approach is well suited for this sort of consortium where participating States have
many differences in their government systems, social structures, and legal ideolo-
gies.37 This approach is different from, for example, the European approach for
membership and further expansion of the European Union (EU).38 The EU’s
approach is based on imposing political and social conditions for States willing to
join the EU.39 Although the ‘European values’ required from its prospective mem-
bers are highly desirable for any State or society,40 States in the SREB area do not
necessarily share the same political philosophy and are at different levels of their






37 See eg Imtiaz Gul, ‘Pakistan, China and the Economic Corridor’ Express Tribune (18 March 2015).
38 The Treaty on the European Union [2012] OJ C326, art 49 (TEU), read with art 2, provides that any
European country may apply for membership if it respects the democratic values of the EU and is com-
mitted to promoting them.
39 Ibid.
40 TEU (n 39) art 2 reads: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belong-
ing to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’
41 Here I would like to direct the reader to my earlier work where, in the context of ‘Asian values’, I have
argued that countries that have likely followed the same path for value internalisation process may still
stand at different levels of economic and social development. Therefore, it is difficult to determine mini-
mum value standards for the developing countries. See Ahmad Ghouri, ‘Determining Hierarchy between
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more reliable long-term goal for regional development.42 The US approach of devel-
opment assistance, for example,43 has not worked to a satisfactory extent.44 The US
aid program has mainly addressed the strategic needs set by the US policy makers
for a given time and has not focused on long-term development goals.45 Over the
past several decades, Pakistan has received billions of dollars in development assis-
tance from the USA, but this has failed to achieve any substantial and long-term eco-
nomic goals.46
The Chinese vision of making long-term and commercially viable investments
through commercial enterprises, instead of advancing loans and aids, will benefit
both China and recipient countries. Instead of giving loans and aids to foreign gov-
ernments, which are susceptible to corruption and inefficiency,47 China will loan
funds to its own companies to carry out the development goals set out in collabora-
tion with the SREB partner countries. This will increase the global competitiveness
of Chinese companies, stimulate growth in the SREB area, and create wealth.48 As
the Action Plan suggests, this action will ‘promote mutually beneficial cooperation to
a new high and in new forms’,49 which will surely reflect ‘new models of international
cooperation and global governance’ to achieve the common ideals through economic
and social development and inject new positive energy into world peace and
development.50
Chinese commentators have listed various reasons for their insistence on the
revival of the SREB area. Shuchun Wang and Qingsong Wan, for example, have
Conflicting Treaties: Are There Vertical Rules in the Horizontal System?’ (2012) 2(2) Asian J Intl Law
235.
42 See eg Tim Worstall, ‘Trade, Not Aid, Is What Improves Life in the Third World’ The Telegraph (22 May
2012); Mustapha Nabli, ‘Trade Not Aid Is the Key to Development’ Daily Star (10 November 2005);
Yoweri K Museveni, ‘We Want Trade, Not Aid’ Wall Street Journal (6 November 2003). For classical
views on ‘trade not aid’, see Covey T Oliver, ‘Trade Not Aid: Myth or Reality’ (1971) 8(3) Houston L
Rev 458; AP Thirlwall, ‘When Is Trade More Valuable Than Aid?’ (1976) 13(1) J Development Studies
35. For a possible spill-over effect of the Chinese ‘trade not aid’ strategy, see Philip Hsiaopong Liu, ‘How
China’s “Trade Not Aid” Strategy Became Construed As Charitable Help: Deconstructing the
“Touching” Idyll of Li Li’s Investment in Africa’ (2011) 12(2) J Identity, Culture, and Politics: An Afro-
Asian Dialogue 1.
43 For an overview of the US Aid program, see Curt Tarnoff and Marian Leonardo Lawson, Foreign Aid: An
Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, CRS Report for Congress (20 April 2012).
44 See eg Gorik Ooms, ‘Stop Development Assistance, Globalize Social Protection’ (2010) 5(1) Yale J Intl
Affairs 150.
45 Eg, the top recipients of US aid in 2012 were Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Egypt. Tarnoff and
Lawson (n 44) have noted that these countries of choice reflect ‘long-standing aid commitments to Israel
and Egypt and the strategic significance of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq’. These countries are definitely
not the poorest in the world deserving the highest attention and levels of aid from the USA stretching
beyond its neighbourhood where countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela are touching upon
the highest levels of poverty in the world.
46 S Akbar Zaidi, Who Benefits from U.S. Aid to Pakistan? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—
Policy Outlook (21 September 2011).
47 See eg Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weder, ‘Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?’
(2002) 92(4) Am Econ Rev 1126; Mike Patton, ‘Foreign Aid: Money Down A Rat Hole?’ Forbes (28
January 2013); Martyn Brown, ‘Fury As Foreign Aid Goes to Top 10 Most Corrupt Nations’ Express (24
April 2015).
48 See eg Yusuf (n 21) 6–7.
49 ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road’ (n 32).
50 Ibid.
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explained a mix of economic and political reasons for the SREB project.51 They view
the SREB as the Chinese response to the 2008 economic crisis in which China is
hoping to develop regional economic cooperation with all of its neighbouring coun-
tries in order to re-ignite economic growth.52 Unfortunately, however, the trade and
investment debate surrounding the SREB coincides with growing global power poli-
tics and regional security challenges.53 The SREB initiative is already viewed as a
blueprint for China’s strategy to become a comprehensive global power.54 The grow-
ing Chinese power has incited researchers to draw parallels between Chinese and US
political and economic interests.55
The regional security issues arising from the situation in the South China Sea
have been viewed as a pretext for the USA to use the situation to its own advantage
by persuading its allies and partners in the region to form a Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP).56 The Chinese SREB initiative is commonly perceived as a response to the
TPP, which will open new trade routes, reducing China’s dependence on the South
China Sea.57 Although there is a serious view that China and the USA are competing
for strategic advantage in the region,58 there is a more convincing broader prospect
on the ‘common narrative’ between the two.59 Kevin Rudd, a former two-time prime
minister of Australia, led a study on the possibilities and impacts of a new China–US
strategic relationship and concluded that, although the two countries have recently
diverged on many aspects of their foreign policy, a common strategic framework for
China–US relations would offer many advantages.60 The promotion of a China–US
51 Shuchun Wang and Qingsong Wan, ‘The Silk Road Economic Belt and The EEU: Rivals or Partners?’
(2014) 15 (3) Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal of Social and Political Studies <http://www.ca-c.org/
online/2014/journal_eng/cac-03/01.shtml> accessed 29 September 2015.
52 Ibid.
53 In his 2015 State of the Union address, President Obama stated: ‘But as we speak, China wants to write
the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region. That would put our workers and our businesses at a dis-
advantage. Why would we let that happen? We should write those rules. We should level the playing field.
That’s why I’m asking both parties to give me trade promotion authority to protect American workers
with strong new trade deals from Asia to Europe that aren’t just free but are also fair. It’s the right thing
to do.’ See eg Roger C Altman and Richard N Haass, ‘Why the Trans-Pacific Partnership Matters’ New
York Times (3 April 2015).
54 See eg Xue Li and Xu Yanzhou, ‘How China Can Perfect Its “Silk Road” Strategy: The Challenges Facing
China’s Silk Road Strategy—and How to Overcome Them’ The Diplomat (9 April 2015).
55 See eg John P Tuman and Shirali Majid, ‘The Political Economy of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment
in Developing Areas’ (2015) Foreign Policy Analysis <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
fpa.12092/abstract> accessed 29 September 2015.
56 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) is a US led regional trade and investment liberalization and regula-
tory treaty. As of 2014, 12 countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region have participated in negotiations
on the TPP, namely Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. Negotiations were originally meant to conclude in 2012, but
contentious issues such as agriculture, intellectual property, services and investments caused significant
roadblocks. October 5, 2015, the US Secretary of State John Kerry announced the conclusion of negotia-
tion, however, the official text of the treaty is yet to be released.
57 Wang and Wan (n 53).
58 See eg Simon Denyer, ‘China Promotes “Asia-Pacific Dream” to Counter U.S. Pivot’Washington Post
(11 November 2014).
59 See eg Kevin Rudd, The Future of U.S.-China Relations under Xi Jinping: Toward a New Framework of
Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose, Summary Report: US-China 21, Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (April 2015).
60 Ibid.
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common strategic framework will give confidence to the SREB participating coun-
tries that currently feel they have been placed in a position where they need to pick
sides with either China or the USA.
What the SREB means for Pakistan is considerably different from other participat-
ing countries not only strategically but also legally. Xue Li and Xu Yanzhou have
identified four categories of the SREB area countries: (i) small- and medium-sized
countries; (ii) countries that have territorial disputes with China; (iii) countries that
are sub-regional powers; and (iv) countries that could potentially act as ‘pivot States’
(meaning they are reliable partners for China and reach a certain threshold of
national power).61 According to Li and Yanzhou, countries in this last group are the
key to Chinese SREB strategy.62 In my view, Pakistan is likely to be part of the group
of pivot States, keeping in view the close defence and economic ties between the two
countries. Traditionally, China–Pakistan relations have been viewed in the context of
their shared history of rivalry with India.63 The deep rooted defence and strategic
ties between the two nations do not suggest otherwise, particularly given that India
has previously tested its military muscles against both nations. This joint strategic
defence aspect of China–Pakistan relations is repeatedly voiced by India. Recently,
for example, India expressed concerns over Chinese investment to build Gwadar
Port, which is located in Balochistan province of Pakistan, and form an integral part
China’s Maritime Silk Road,64 suggesting that the Gwadar Port will be used by
China for military purposes despite both China and Pakistan insisting that the proj-
ect is purely commercial.65 However, despite some existing scepticism, many com-
mentators view Chinese trade and investment agreements with its neighbouring
nations as primarily driven by geopolitical concerns, where such agreements are
meant to demonstrate that the rise of China will be a peaceful one.66
There is more to say about the China–Pakistan relationship than the Indian con-
text especially when China is gradually normalizing its relations with India and trying
61 Li and Yanzhou (n 56).
62 Li and Yanzhou have identified four categories of Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) area countries: small-
and medium-sized countries; countries that have territorial disputes with China; countries that are
sub-regional powers; and countries that could potentially act as ‘pivot states’ (meaning they are reliable
partners for China and reach a certain threshold of national power). According to Li and Yanzhou, coun-
tries in this last group are the key to Chinese SREB strategy. See Li and Yanzhou (n 56). In my view,
Pakistan is likely to be part of the pivot states group keeping in view the close defence and economic ties
between the two countries.
63 See eg Asifa Jahangir, Pakistan-China Strategic Partnership: Challenges and Prospects: Changing Dynamics in
Pak-China Bilateral Relations after 9/11 (Lap Lambert Academic Publishing 2013).
64 ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road’ (n 32). On the Maritime Silk Road, see eg
Ziangqian Gong, ‘Building of the New Maritime Silk Road: Its Constraints and Prospects’ (2014) 7(1)
Journal of East Asia & Intl L 235.
65 See eg Ziad Haider, ‘Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port’ (2005) 6(1) Georgetown J Intl Affairs
95.
66 See eg Axel Berger, Investment Rules in Chinese Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements: Is China
Following the Global Trend towards Comprehensive Agreements? Discussion Paper, German Development
Institute (July 2013); Barry Buzan, ‘China in International Society: Is “Peaceful Rise” Possible?’ (2010)
3(1) Chinese J Intl Politics 5; Zheng Bijian, ‘China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great-Power Status’ Foreign
Affairs (October 2005).
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to form a more balanced policy regarding these two neighbours.67 The evolving
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) consortium is an example
where the five participating countries have concluded an agreement establishing the
New Development Bank (NDB).68 In 2003, China and India established a joint
study group to examine the potential for economic engagement between the two
countries. In October 2007, the joint task force finalized its report on the feasibility
of a China–India Regional Trading Arrangement (RTA).69 Compared to Pakistan,
China’s trade and investment relationship with India has not grown as rapidly. The
pace of the China–India RTA negotiations has been slow, although the two countries
concluded a BIT in 2007,70 which they agreed to apply retrospectively to cover
investments made before and after its coming into force.71 There is no doubt that
shades of shared historical rivalry with India are present in the China–Pakistan
relationship and that China has realized that its economic prospects are tied to both
of these nations.72 During his visit to India in September 2014, President Xi
announced US $20 billion of investments in India’s infrastructure over five years.73
Nevertheless, the Indian context in the China–Pakistan relationship gives interesting
insights, and some of the Indian concerns regarding the CPEC may also be legiti-
mate. In order to successfully implement the SREB Action Plan, both China and
Pakistan need to devise a collective strategy to address these concerns.
Pakistan still enjoys a special place in the SREB, as Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi observed: ‘If comparing this “One Belt and One Road” initiative to a sym-
phony that is participated by all countries and produces benefits to all participants,
then China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is the glorious melody in the chapter one of
this symphony’.74 Ejaz Hussain, Zhang Yuan, and Ghulam Ali have observed that the
CPEC is not only a land or rail connectivity passage between the two countries, but
it is indeed a comprehensive concept that encompasses economic and strategic inte-
gration between the two countries in the long run.75 In spite of the economic and
geopolitical importance of the CPEC for the two nations, and for the overall success
of the SREB, a number of issues surround this project. Aarish Khan, for example, has
highlighted that the security situation in Pakistan, political unrest, administrative
67 Eg, China has gradually distanced itself from the ongoing Kashmir issue saying that it is a bilateral dispute
between Pakistan and India requiring a bilateral solution. For an overview of China’s changing positions
on the Kashmir issue, see John W Garver, ‘China’s Kashmir Policies’ (2004) 3(1) India Review 1. See also
Sheikh M Arif, ‘A History of Sino-Indian Relations: From Conflict to Cooperation’ (2013) 1(4) Intl J
Political Science & Development 129.
68 See ‘Sixth Brics Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, 15 July 2014’ (2014) 20(3) Law & Business Rev of the
Americas 483.
69 See MOFCOM, China FTA Network, China–India Regional Trade Arrangement Joint Feasibility Study
(2007).
70 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, done on 21 November 2006,
entered into force 1 August 2007 (China–India BIT).
71 China–-India BIT (n 72) art 2 ‘Scope of the Agreement’.
72 See eg Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (Oxford University Press 2015).
73 See eg Harsh V Pant, ‘Why Xi Jinping’s Visit to India Is Significant’ BBC (16 September 2014).
74 ‘Chinese FM: China-Pakistan Brotherhood Will Never Go Rusty’ Xinhua (13 February 2015).
75 Ejaz Hussain, Zhang Yuan and Dr Ghulam Ali, ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ Daily Times (4 April
2015).
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issues, and the skill level of the Pakistani workforce are going to pose major chal-
lenges for implementation of the CPEC.76 However, on a broader legal and policy
level, the following challenges will face the CPEC and the SREB projects in the com-
ing years.
Transparency
Given the overwhelming importance of the CPEC for the people of both countries,
both governments have been repeatedly blamed for a lack of transparency in their
dealings. The CPEC includes US $5.9 billion for road projects and US $3.7 billion
for railway projects, along with a multi-billion dollars worth of coal, wind, solar and
hydro energy projects, but both governments have been reluctant to disclose the
maps for the roads and the railways to be built.77 There is a degree of dissatisfaction
in Pakistan over the Sharif government’s handling of the controversy related to the
original route and the changes made by the government to favour personal or politi-
cal interests instead of real development and public interests.78 Husain, for example,
has lamented that the existing secrecy over the CPEC has turned it into a labyrinth.79
Transparency will bring legitimacy for the CPEC, which includes not only roads but
also a variety of social infrastructure in Balochistan and other areas aligned with the
corridor.80 Commentators from Pakistan have noted that transparency would ensure
that the conversation between China and Pakistan remains focused on the country’s
national interests, as opposed to the parochial interests of a few.81 Likewise, Irene
Chan has criticized China for not having effectively opened its grand connectivity
ideas for public discussion in the SREB countries in order to generate feedback and
devise better understanding of the regional needs.82 The continuous lack of transpar-
ency and open public discussion is likely to increase the public’s existing mistrust in
the projects.
Fair distribution of benefits
The China–Pakistan economic exchange should be transformed by distributive jus-
tice so that the poor remain the priority.83 The fair distribution of the benefits within
society of the returns of improved trade and foreign investment are by no means
automatically assured.84 For example, studies from Latin American countries have
shown that increased trade has not resulted in ‘total development’ of their societies,
which is the only kind that really counts and includes social and civic development,
modern innovation and improvement, as well as purely economic growth.85
76 Kahn (n 16) 16.
77 Khurram Husain, ‘Analysis: China-Pakistan Corridor or Labyrinth?’ The Dawn News (18 February 2015).
78 See eg Khawar Ghumman, ‘Economists Call for More Transparency on Corridor Projects’ Dawn News
(20 April 2015).
79 Husain (n 79).
80 See eg Gul (n 38).
81 See eg ‘Corridor Furore’ Dawn News (Editorial) (5 February 2015).
82 Irene Chan, ‘China’s Maritime Silk Road: The Politics of Routes’ RSIS Commentary, No 051 (12 March
2015).
83 Hussain, Yuan and Ali (n 77).
84 Oliver (n 43) 461.
85 Ibid.
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Although a regional market is a great initiative, the primary basis for development
rests in an increased exchange of goods and services within the economy itself.86
Senge Sering, for example, has observed that despite the existence of PTAs, FTAs,
and Early Harvest Programmes, local populations along the existing China–Pakistan
road links, such as the Karakoram Corridor, have failed to derive the expected bene-
fits.87 The SREB Action Plan is based on ‘market operation’, and it assigns primary
role to enterprises.88 In regard to governance, the Action Plan merely states: ‘Let the
governments perform their due functions’.89 Although the Action Plan states that the
SREB is a ‘systematic project’ and aims to ‘integrate the development strategies’ of
the SREB area countries, the absence of a detailed vision on total development
in the mainstream SREB agenda is worrying. If the rules of development are not
aimed at achieving total development, the legitimacy of the system will be cast in
doubt.
Implementation of labour standards
The rubrics of the CPEC are gradually emerging although there is no concise policy
statement or detailed action plan announced by either government. For example, a
statement on the official website of Pakistan Ministry of Planning, Development and
Reform reads: ‘CPEC will integrate all provincial capitals into the economic mesh
which would help in consolidation at national level and it will also contribute to
regional integration, harmony and economic development’.90 The Pakistan Board of
Investment has released a document on President Xi’s visit, which sheds some light
on the government’s vision as to how the CPEC will help local populations.91 The
basic idea appears to be that special economic zones (SEZs) will be established
alongside the CPEC, which will create jobs and contribute to the socio-economic
development in the SEZs areas.92 The Special Economic Zones Act 2012 (SEZs
Act) was promulgated to facilitate the development of industrial infrastructure in
Pakistan through public-private partnership and also by private developers alone.93
This law provides many business incentives, including allowing for the duty-free
import of machinery and equipment for developers and enterprises established in
SEZs.94
Some SEZs already exist in Pakistan,95 and the overall SEZs policy looks positive.
A study spanning 30 years of global SEZs practice has revealed the positive impacts
of SEZs on a country’s economy, but it has criticized the poor working conditions,
exploitation of women workers, and poor implementation of environmental
86 Ibid.
87 Senge H Sering, Expansion of the Karakoram Corridor: Implications and Prospects, IDSA Occasional Paper
No 27 (September 2012) 20.
88 ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road’ (n 32).
89 Ibid.
90 See CPEC <http://www.pc.gov.pk> accessed 29 September 2015.
91 The undated document of 56 pages is entitled ‘Pak–China Economic Corridor’ (on file with the author).
92 Ibid.
93 Special Economic Zones Act (No XX) of 2012 (SEZs Act).
94 Ibid ss 34–7.
95 Eg, in Khairpur, Korangi Creek, and Bin Qasim.
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standards in the SEZs.96 The SEZs Act provides for the application of all existing
labour laws to the SEZs;97 however, no special provisions have been made for the
enforcement of those laws in the SEZs specifically. In view of the existing poor
implementation records generally, the SEZs Act could have suggested a special moni-
toring and enforcement mechanism of labour standards in SEZs. The SEZs law
appears to have created everything special for the business community—from special
land registration to tax regimes—silence on the labour and environment standards is
disquieting and harmful for the overall legitimacy of the CPEC.
New models of global governance
According to the Action Plan, the SREB is an endeavour to ‘seek new models of
international cooperation and global governance’, which is intended to ‘inject new
positive energy into world peace and development’.98 Before the SREB initiative,
China had mainly used bilateral arrangements to invest in other countries. These
investments have so far been mainly executed by State-owned corporations, which,
according to Javier Solana, do not often adhere to international best practices.99 The
emphasis on new models of global governance in the SREB Action Plan clearly indi-
cates that China is now moving towards replacing bilateral arrangements with multi-
lateral processes. Although China must have a greater role in global governance
commensurate to its economic success, it must also ensure that its corporations
meet international standards of corporate governance and social responsibility.
There is no compelling evidence of wrongdoing by Chinese companies abroad;
however, absence of corporate governance and social responsibility agendas in the
actions plan will attract criticism. For example, Andrew Kuchins has contended that
since Chinese companies are unconstrained by legislation such as the US Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 or shareholder reporting, they ‘will continue to line
the pockets of local, regional, and national officials in Central Asia to strengthen their
access to the region’s mineral and hydrocarbon resources and will build more transit
infrastructure to ship these goods to the Chinese market’.100 Although President Xi’s
crackdown on corruption and his recent ‘four comprehensives’ send strong signals to
the world that he seriously means to solve the menace of corruption at home,101
there is more to be done to ensure best practices by Chinese companies abroad in
order to both develop goodwill and prevent future malpractices.
This is particularly important when dealing with countries such as Pakistan, which
ranks among the most corrupt countries in the world.102 Since most of the Chinese
business with Pakistan is based on the ‘trade-not-aid’ model and the Pakistani
96 See World Bank Group, Special Economic Zones: Performance, Lessons Learned, and Implications for Zone
Development (April 2008).
97 SEZs Act (n 95) s 30.
98 ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road’ (n 32).
99 Javier Solana, ‘China and Global Governance’ Project Syndicate (30 March 2015).
100 Kuchins (n 26).
101 See eg Zheng Yongnian, ‘China Needs a Strong Leader Like Xi—but the Rule of Law Like Singapore’
World Post (19 April 2015).
102 See eg Ram Mashru, ‘Pakistan: As Corrupt As Ever? Pakistan’s Corruption Problem Remains Serious
and a Major Impediment to Good Governance’ The Diplomat (8 January 2014).
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government will not have direct access to the funds, which is usually the case with
foreign aid,103 Chinese legislation targeting foreign corrupt practices of both individ-
uals and companies will be a welcome step. It is encouraging that the SREB Action
Plan requires Chinese companies to take social responsibility in protecting local bio-
diversity and eco-environment, since there is a lot more that can be done to enhance
the legitimacy of the SREB initiative. Domestic legislation in China to mitigate the
problems of a transnational nature, such as laws remedying foreign torts, including
environmental, labour, and human rights protection clauses in the new free trade
and investment agreements, should also be considered to ensure the rule of law in
Chinese business abroad.
Legal transformation
China is using a huge cache of its foreign exchange reserves to fund investments
abroad, which will strategically disperse its industries in line with its changing domes-
tic comparative advantage and enable it to acquire overseas assets.104 In response,
countries such as Pakistan are depending heavily on Chinese investments for growth
and development.105 However, there is an increasing worry of over-domination by
China in its neighbouring economies in the pretext of investments. For example,
Kuchins has noted that increasing Chinese domination of the Mongolian economy
has stirred the Parliament in Ulaanbaatar to pass legislation requiring prior legislative
approval of foreign investments over US $70 million.106 In contrast, when more
countries strive to make their investment environment more attractive to a wider set
of bidders, the government of Pakistan has facilitated this action by handing over
development projects to Chinese companies and bypassing the international
competitive bidding process.107 Although China–Pakistan relations are based on
long-standing mutual trust, both China and Pakistan should ensure that large-scale
Chinese investments in Pakistan are aimed at improving governance, ensuring
transparent and effective rule of law, and strengthening property rights. If this is not
done, China’s economic presence is likely to be viewed as a dominating device in the
longer run, which may push the SREB partners away. If Chinese foreign investments
are not aligned with these objectives, reviving the network of regional transit
corridors may not achieve its potential.
The Chinese government needs to pay careful attention to these concerns in
order to forge the broader legitimacy of the SREB and the CPEC projects and to
make them a realistic and efficient tool for sustainable development in the region. As
is clear from the above discussions, these concerns may not be applicable to all
103 See eg Azeem Ibrahim, U.S. Aid to Pakistan: U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption, Belfer
Center Discussion Paper no 2009-06, International Security Program, Harvard Kennedy School (July
2009).
104 See eg Yusuf (n 21) 10.
105 See eg Khawar Ghumman, ‘PML-N Puts All Its MoUs in Chinese Basket’ The Dawn News (13 April
2015).
106 Kuchins (n 26).
107 See eg Khaleeq Kiani, ‘Chinese Firms to Get Contracts for Two CPEC Projects’ Dawn News (13 August
2015); Iftikhar Alam, ‘Rules Being Bypassed to Facilitate China Investment’ The Nation (26 August
2014).
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SREB partners in the same way and may require a pragmatic approach depending
upon the internal political and legal conditions in a SREB partner State. However, a
clear and coherent statement of policy on these issues by the Chinese government
is required to mitigate potential damage in the execution of the SREB Action
Plan. Such policy will not only legitimize the overall SREB vision but will also
harness the vision with intended objectives and will initiate a new era of regional
development.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN PAKISTAN
China has recently made several changes in its outward investment policy, clearly
indicating a shift towards the industrialized country approach of free movement of
investment capital.108 This shift is illustrated by the actions undertaken by the rele-
vant bodies to implement the government’s ‘go-global’ policy.109 For example, the
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) lifted restrictions on the amount
of foreign exchange that is available annually to domestic investors’ outbound invest-
ments and announced in 2009 that Chinese firms can seek financing from multiple
sources. The Ministry of Commerce simplified and shortened the approval proce-
dures in 2009, and the National Development Reform Commission reiterated in
2011 its desire to decentralize the outward investment approval decision process.110
In addition to increasing the Chinese companies’ share in the global marketplace,
these regulatory changes will facilitate the implementation of the CPEC and other
SREB projects.
Over three hundred Chinese companies are actively doing business in Pakistan,
and the existing volume of Chinese investments in Pakistan is about US $1 billion.111
Chinese investments in Pakistan have flowed in multiple sectors and have taken sev-
eral forms. Chinese private companies, for example, have entered Pakistan through
the compulsory licensing regime put in place in Pakistan for a particular sector (for
example, in the telecom sector, China Mobile Pakistan, or Zong) and through joint
ventures with local business partners for consumer products business (for example,
joint venture of the Haier Group and the Ruba Group, Hair Pakistan). The invest-
ments of Chinese State-owned companies in Pakistan have ranged from joint
defence productions (for example, joint production of military jets),112 to mining
and infrastructure development.113 Most of the infrastructure development projects
108 See eg Peter J Buckley, Foreign Direct Investment, China and the World Economy (Palgrave Macmillan
2009). For the evolution of different patterns of Chinese outward investments, see Nargiza Salidjanova,
‘Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment’ USCC Staff Research Report
(30 March 2011) 4–5.
109 See eg Duncan Freeman, China’s Outward Investment: Institutions, Constraints and Challenges, BICCS
Asia Paper no 7(4) (12 May 2013).
110 Ibid.
111 See eg Danial Khan, ‘Working Together to Strengthen China-Pakistan Relations’ <http://
www.cctv.com> accessed 29 September 2015.
112 See eg Syed Fazl-e-Haider, ‘Pakistan and China Prove Powerful Combination in Aviation’ The National
(25 November 2013).
113 See eg Kataria and Naveed (n 3) 404–8. For an overview of outward investments by Chinese State-
owned companies, see Freemann (n 112).
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are conducted through build, operate, and transfer (BOT) arrangements.114 There is
no existing research showing different levels of Chinese investment in Pakistan divid-
ing the volumes of investment between private companies and Chinese State-owned
companies. The trend is mixed, but clearly a majority of Chinese investments in
Pakistan are made by State-owned companies.
The volume of Chinese investments in Pakistan is going to increase tremendously
following the implementation of the CPEC. The stakes are high, with multiple legal
and policy implications for these investments concerning both countries. Although
investments in Pakistan made by some Chinese State-owned companies may have
strategic ambitions, these investments will be financed by the Chinese State-owned
banks and are expected to make profits just like other commercial enterprises.115
According to Li and Yanzhou, an unprofitable investment made by a Chinese State-
owned company, which turns into a bad debt, is a serious violation of the Chinese
principles of foreign exchange reserves management.116 The longer-term commit-
ments usually required in the BOT arrangements for infrastructure and energy-
related projects are always susceptible to an array of challenges, and a pre-defined
and concrete legal framework is necessary to cushion against political and policy tur-
moil. Although Pakistan’s friendship with China has been perhaps the only consis-
tent element in the country’s foreign policy throughout its history, a solid domestic
regime on foreign investment governance is imperative to satisfy both the legitimacy
(that is, through proper implementation of domestic validating rules and procedures)
and success (that is, through the proper definition and allocation of rights and
responsibilities) of foreign investments.
Additionally, the two countries have special arrangements to facilitate the flow of
investments. A company named the Pakistan–China Investment Company Limited
(PCICL) was established as a development finance institution (DFI) for the promo-
tion of trade, investment, and economic growth of Pakistan.117 The PCICL was
incorporated in Pakistan as a non-banking finance company (NBFC),118 with an
authorized capital of US $200 million and was formally launched in December 2007.
The company is a joint venture with equal equity contribution by the Government
of Pakistan (GOP) and the China Development Bank (CDB), which is a Chinese
State-owned bank. The main objective of the PCICL is to invest in the financial sec-
tor and infrastructure projects.119 According to the information provided on its offi-
cial website, the PCICL aims to become a hub for investment activity and add value
to sectors such as industry, agriculture, services, information and technology, manu-
facturing, real estate, and infrastructure. The PCICL also aims to offer conventional
and innovative solutions to investors and projects through a full range of investment
114 See eg Syed Irfan Raza, ‘Bids Invited for Pak-China Economic Corridor Project’ Dawn News (24
December 2014). For detailed analysis of the government administrative procedures for build, operate,
and transfer (BOT) contracts in Pakistan, see S Mubin and A Ghaffar, ‘BOT Contracts: Applicability in
Pakistan for Infrastructure Development’ (2008) 3 Pakistan J Engineering & Applied Sciences 33.
115 Salidjanova (n 111) 6.
116 Li and Yanzhou (n 56).
117 See <https://www.pakchinainvest.com/> accessed 29 September 2015.
118 See Companies Ordinance (No XLVII) of 1984, ss 282 A and 282 B; Non-Banking Finance Companies
(Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 2003.
119 Pakistan–China Investment Company Limited (PCICL), Financial Statement (2013) 6.
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banking services. The CPEC-related projects that are based on joint ventures
between Chinese and Pakistani companies can be conveniently financed through the
PCICL.120
In view of its particular character and mandate, the PCICL will operate as a spe-
cial vehicle—that is, a DFI—to transport Chinese investments in Pakistan. However,
there are potential legal uncertainties with regard to the joint venture DFIs. The
international practice is that DFIs are based in the country where the investments
are coming from rather than in the country where the investments are being made
and are tied to the interest of home country firms.121 The joint venture structure of
the PCICL is entirely different, both legally and operationally, from the investors’
home country-based DFIs.122 Perhaps the idea behind joint venture DFIs is to make
them more bilateral rather than home country driven. A few other bilateral DFIs
exist in Pakistan, which are also established as joint ventures between the GOP and
other friendly countries.123 Although these joint venture companies are dubbed as
DFIs, the term DFI is not defined in Pakistani law. Essentially, the PCICL remains
an NBFC incorporated under Pakistani company law.124 From the international law
perspective, the PCICL kind of DFIs would likely be classified as foreign investments
covered under a typical bilateral investment treaty. Since the PCICL has been cre-
ated with equal equity contribution by the GOP and the CBD, it is unclear if the
CPEC projects will also be financed through the same arrangements.
Overall, Pakistan has a relatively open foreign investment regime.125 The Pakistan
Board of Investment (BOI) announced a fairly detailed foreign investment policy in
2013.126 With an attractive taxation regime and financial exchange and remittance
regulations, Pakistan is one of the most favourable regulatory regimes for foreign
investors. The existing laws on the protection of property are also fairly comprehen-
sive and balanced. The right to own property is established in the Constitution of
Pakistan.127 Although there is no constitutional maximum limit to property owner-
ship, the Constitution authorizes Parliament to place limits upon ownership.128 In
regard to the protection of property rights, Article 24 of the Constitution provides:
• No person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law.
120 See eg Khaleeq Kiani, ‘Pak-China Investment Company to Be Revived’ Dawn News (6 September
2014).
121 Christian Kingombe, Isabella Massa and Dirk Willem te Velde, Overseas Development Institute,
Comparing Development Finance Institutions Literature Review (20 January 2011) ix.
122 Ibid.
123 A list of development financial investments (DFIs) is available at <http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecib/mem
bers.htm> accessed 29 September 2015.
124 State Bank of Pakistan, Financial Stability Review (2007–8) 181.
125 Shahid Yousaf, Can Chinese FDI Accelerate Pakistan’s Growth? Growth Dialogue, George Washington
University Working Paper (February 2013).
126 The policy can be found on the Pakistan Board of Investment (BOI) website <http://boi.gov.pk/
Home.aspx> accessed 29 September 2015 (Pakistan Investment Policy 2013).
127 Constitution of Pakistan 1973 (as modified up to 28 February 2012) arts 22 and 23. It may be noted
that art 22, which gives the right to own property, is limited to citizens only; whereas art 23, which deals
with the protection of property rights, has general application.
128 Constitution of Pakistan (n 130) art 253.
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• No property shall be compulsorily acquired or taken possession of save for a pub-
lic purpose, and save by the authority of law which provides for compensation
therefor and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on
and the manner in which compensation is to be determined and given.
Article 24(3) of the Constitution further provides a fairly reasonable list of public
purposes that may give rise to the taking of property. Article 173 of the Constitution
specifically empowers the executive authorities of the federal and provincial govern-
ments to acquire properties within their respective territories. However, Article
24(4) states that the adequacy of compensation paid on the expropriation by govern-
ments cannot be called in question in any court in Pakistan. This may be viewed as a
violation of due process of law. However, the law specifically dealing with the protec-
tion of foreign investments—that is, Foreign Private Investment (Promotion &
Protection) Act 1976 (FPIA)—provides rules on the calculation of compensation.129
This law is applicable to ‘foreign private investment’, covering investments made in
goods and services.130 The law provides that foreign investment shall not be acquired
except under the due process of law131 and also states the following three elements
of the due process of law:132
• payment of adequate compensation;
• in the currency of the country of origin of investors; and
• specification of the principles on, and the manner in, which compensation is to be
determined and given.
The FPIA also provides for the protection of agreements between a foreign investor or
creditor and any person in Pakistan in the event that the government decides to take
over or acquire a foreign investment in the public’s interest.133 The law further prohib-
its discrimination against foreign investments and accords them no less favourable
treatment in the application of laws, rules, and regulations generally134 and particularly
requires equal treatment of foreign and national investors for taxation purposes.135
These provisions cover both contractual and regulatory matters. The law also clarifies
that its provisions are not in derogation of protection to foreign investment under a
BIT,136 therefore, any additional or more stringent protections offered to foreign
investors under a BIT would override the provisions of this law.
The Protection of Economic Reforms Act of 1992 (PERA) safeguards foreign-
owned industrial or commercial property against acquisition by the government.137
129 Foreign Private Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act (No XLII) of 1976 (FPIA).
130 Ibid s 2.
131 Ibid s 5, para 2.
132 Ibid.
133 FPIA (n 132) s 5, para 1.
134 Ibid s 9. See also Pakistan Investment Policy 2013 (n 129) para 3.1.2, 15.
135 FPIA (n 132) s 8.
136 Ibid s 1.
137 Protection of Economic Reforms Act (No XII) of 1992, s 8 (PERA).
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This law also legitimizes the privatization process and prohibits the retaking of
privatized property or enterprise ‘for any reason whatsoever’.138 Additionally, PERA
preserves financial obligations incurred by the government with respect to privatized
industries or enterprises.139 It would be fair to conclude that these laws create a level
playing field between foreign investors and local competitors at the post-entry stage
and meet the international law standards of treatment of foreign investments.
However, since no Pakistani court has yet deliberate on these laws, it is uncertain if
the courts will interpret these provisions in accordance with international law.
One issue with these two laws is that neither of them provides procedures for
their judicial enforcement and dispute resolution. Article 199 of the Constitution of
Pakistan would fill this gap, which empowers the High Courts to entertain cases
concerning the infringement of legal rights.140 An act in violation of law by govern-
ment officials can be remedied by the High Courts where no other appropriate rem-
edy is provided by law. However, despite fairly stringent provisions of the FPIA or
PERA, no foreign investor has so far approached the Pakistani High Courts alleging
violation of their rights under these laws, although cases brought at international
arbitration by foreign investors include claims of expropriation against the GOP.141
Whereas, at least one foreign investor has also claimed before an international arbi-
tration tribunal that the GOP has accorded less favourable treatment compared to
local and other international investors.142
Although the Pakistan BOI publicizes that foreign investments are protected by
the 1976 and 1992 laws,143 it is not surprising that foreign investors have not yet
brought legal actions in Pakistani courts on the bases of these laws and have instead
preferred to bring BIT claims before supra-national arbitration tribunals. Pakistani
courts have a poor reputation and an atrocious record when it comes to the enforce-
ment of foreign investors’ rights.144 In addition to making good laws in accordance
with international standards, there is a need to build trust in the Pakistan legal sys-
tem in order to attract more foreign investments. Adequate enforcement mecha-
nisms and a concrete strategy of Pakistani courts from a clear line of decided cases
would boost investor confidence. In particular, this would attract medium- and
small-size investors who would not be willing, or able, to take their disputes to costly
international arbitration.
138 Ibid s 7.
139 Ibid s 10.
140 Constitution of Pakistan 1973 (n 130) art 199.
141 See eg Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No ARB/
03/29, Final Award (27 August 2009) paras 97(iv), 113, 115, 395, 424–39 (Bayindir); Impregilo SpA v
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, (22 April 2005) paras
34(4), 55, 56, 272 and 274; SGS Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale de Surveillance SA v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (6 August 2003) para 35;
Tethyan Copper Company Pty Limited v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No ARB/12/1,
Decision on Claimant’s Request for Provisional Measures (13 December 2012) paras 52, 64.
142 Bayindir (n 144) paras 97(iii), 149, 386–90.
143 Pakistan Investment Policy 2013 (n 129) paras 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 15.
144 See eg Ikram Ullah, ‘Reko Diq Case: Another Intervention from Supreme Court of Pakistan’ (2014)
17(6) Intl Arbitration L Rev 61; Umer Akram Chaudhry, ‘Pakistani Court Interference in Arbitration
Proceedings—Yet Again!’ Kluwer Arbitration Blog (27 February 2012).
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Arbitration, as we know, has become a popular system for the resolution of dis-
putes between commercial parties as well disputes between commercial parties and
government bodies. Even disputes arising from within a business enterprise, such as
employment and labour disputes145 and owner–participant disputes,146 are now
increasingly decided through arbitration. In Pakistan, arbitration in such ‘intra-
enterprise disputes’ is possible,147 but there are only a few existing examples.148 This
is mainly because the arbitration law in Pakistan has not kept pace with the needs of
the business community. There is no formal institution in Pakistan to provide admin-
istrative support to arbitrate intra-enterprise or enterprise-to-enterprise disputes. An
arbitration institute was proposed in 2009, but the proposal could not pass the legis-
lative process.149
The current arbitration law in Pakistan dates from 1940,150 which prescribes rules
for arbitration with or without the intervention of a court.151 The 1940 law applies
to both domestic and international commercial arbitrations, however, the rules to
distinguish between these two types of arbitrations are problematic.152 The law also
allows a degree of uncertainty regarding the enforcement of foreign arbitration agree-
ments and awards.153 In 2010, a new item was inserted in the legislative list of the
Constitution of Pakistan, authorizing the Pakistani federal government to make laws
on international treaties and international arbitration.154 The difficulties regarding
the enforcement of international commercial arbitration agreements and awards are
now almost certainly resolved by the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration
Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011, which implements the New
York Convention in Pakistan.155 Some recent cases decided by Pakistani courts
under this new law also suggest that courts are now willing to enforce foreign arbitra-
tion agreements between private parties more aptly than before.156
Pakistani law does not distinguish between purely private disputes and public-
private disputes. However, courts are very sensitive to this distinction and are shy of
145 See eg Jean R Sternlight, ‘Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?’ (2004) 57 Stanford L Rev 1631;
Christopher Bovis, ‘Labor Arbitration As an Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement Procedure in
World Labor Markets’ (1994) 45(3) Labor L J 147.
146 Hal S Scott and Leslie N Silverman, ‘Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual Arbitration for
Stockholder Disputes’ (2013) 36 Harvard J L & Public Policy 1187; ‘Notes: Arbitration As a Means of
Settling Disputes within Close Corporations’ (1963) 63(2) Columbia L Rev 267.
147 See Companies Ordinance (n 121) part IX.
148 For trends in arbitration on labour related disputes, see Riffat Bawa and Waqar Hashmi, ‘Labor
Unionization in Pakistan: History and Trends’ (2010) 2(2) Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies
78, 81.
149 See Arbitration Bill 2009, Part V. For some analysis of the Arbitration Bill, see Ahmad Ghouri, Law and
Practice of International Arbitration and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Pakistan (Springer
2012) 3–4.
150 Arbitration Act (No X) of 1940.
151 Ghouri (n 152) 5-6.
152 Ibid 11–19.
153 Ibid.
154 Constitution of Pakistan 1973 (n 130) Fourth Schedule, part I, item 32.
155 Ghouri (n 152) 39–42. Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7
ILM 1046 (1968).
156 Ibid. See also Fal Oil Company Ltd. v Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd, 2014 Pakistan Legal Decisions
(Sindh) 427; Abdullah v Messrs CNAN Group SPA, 2014 Pakistan Legal Decisions (Sindh) 349.
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enforcing arbitration agreements between private parties and government bodies.157
Although Pakistan has also implemented the International Convention for the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention) through domestic legislation,158
courts have struggled to distinguish the international investment arbitration from
international commercial arbitration.159 Recently, a few commercial arbitration
awards rendered by ad hoc tribunals composed of local arbitrators have been
reported in Pakistan.160 The new law on SEZs, which will have direct implications
for the execution of the CPEC and the SREB policy agendas, also makes provisions
for arbitration as an alternate system for dispute resolution.161 In the absence of an
established institute to provide dispute resolution and arbitration services, growth of
domestic commercial arbitration as a suitable alternative to litigation will remain dor-
mant. Since the CPEC has brought the two countries closer than ever, it would be
pertinent to establish a China–Pakistan arbitration centre at the roundabouts of the
CPEC to serve the existing and future needs of the business community.
With regard to the protection of intellectual property (IP), Pakistan became party
to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) on 1 January 1995.162 The corre-
sponding domestic legislation at that time was outdated.163 The first copyright laws
were enacted in 1962,164 but recent legislation on patents, trademarks, and the layout
designs of integrated circuits and registered designs have comprehensively updated
the Pakistani IP regime.165 The Intellectual Property Organization (IPO) of Pakistan
was created in 2005166 and is tasked with the integrated management of all types of
intellectual property and enforcement coordination.167 Now Pakistan has a fairly
modern intellectual property regime, but there are still issues related to efficient
enforcement. The 2012 IPO legislation has facilitated the establishment of special
157 This is evident from the consolidated judgment of the Pakistan Supreme Court in several cases filed
against and by Tethyan in Pakistani courts on the Rico Diq mining licence dispute. The consolidated
judgement and detailed decision was reported as Maulana Abdul Haque Baloch v Government of
Balochistan, 2013 Pakistan Legal Decisions (Supreme Court) 641. See also (2012) Supreme Court
Monthly Review 402.
158 Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act (No IX) of 2011. For some analysis of this Act, see
Ghouri (n 152) 44–7.
159 Lakhra Power Generation Company Limited (LPGCL) v Karadeniz Powership Kaya Bey, 2014 Corporate
Law Decisions (Sindh) 337.
160 See eg Wi-Tribe Limited v Telecard Limited, Award of 7 January 2010, 2010 Corporate Law Decision 500
(Justice (R) Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, Chairman, Justice (R) Nasir Aslam Zahid and Justice (R) GH
Malik).
161 SEZs Act (n 95) s 39.
162 Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 1869 UNTS 299 (1994).
163 The regime was based on the Patent Act of 1911 and the Trademarks Act of 1940, which Pakistan inher-
ited from the British India.
164 Copyright Ordinance (No XXXIV) of 1962.
165 Patents Ordinance of 2000, Trade Marks Ordinance of 2001, Registered Layout-Designs of Integrated
Circuits Ordinance of 2000, Registered Designs Ordinance of 2000.
166 An Ordinance to Provide for the Establishment of the Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan
(No XXI) of 2005. Subsequently, the Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act of 2012.
167 Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act (n 169) s 13.
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Intellectual Property Tribunals with the power for trial and prosecution of offences,
but the Tribunals are yet to be established.168
The Pakistani domestic legal regime for foreign investments is based on both con-
stitutional guarantees and statutory protections. These legal provisions are fairly
extensive and cover all of the important aspects of foreign investment, including
standards of treatment and payment of compensation for expropriation. The
Pakistani government is keen to attract foreign investments and has put in place
good incentives for investors. This existing combination of a legal and policy frame-
work provides strong foundations for the implementation of the CPEC projects and
other investments by Chinese companies. The PCICL can provide an institutional
base and financial conduit for joint ventures between Chinese companies and
Pakistani counterparts. However, certain weaknesses exist such as poor enforcement
of legal rights by Pakistani courts and the absence of an arbitration institution to pro-
vide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to formal litigation in courts.
CHINA–PAKISTAN BILATERAL INVESTMENT REGIME
Pakistan has a good network of BITs in place, and 47 of them are currently in
force.169 Pakistan’s BIT regime began in the 1950s, and, in fact, the first-ever con-
temporary BIT was signed between Pakistan and Germany in 1959.170 Recently,
however, Pakistan has taken a cautious approach in signing BITs. For example,
Pakistan has refused to sign a BIT with the USA, although the USA is so far the larg-
est investor in Pakistan.171 The Board of Investment Ordinance 2001 has mandated
the Pakistan BOI to negotiate and conclude BITs.172 The BOI has so far signed four
agreements and is also developing its own model BIT in order to modernize
Pakistan’s BIT regime.173
The China–Pakistan BIT was signed in 1989 and came into force in September
1990.174 Article 13 of the BIT provides that it can be terminated after 10 years from
the date of coming into force by either contracting party with a notice to the other
party, and the termination will take effect one year after service of notice of termina-
tion by either party. Since no notice of termination has been served, the BIT remains
in force. The China–Pakistan FTA,175 which has been in force since July 2007, also
includes a comprehensive chapter on investments.176 Since both the BIT and FTA
168 Ibid, ss 15–19.
169 Pakistan Investment Policy 2013 (n 129) para 3.1.3, 15.
170 See eg Ahmad Ghouri and Nida Mahmood, ‘Deciphering Pakistan’s Foreign Investment Policy: A
Review of Pakistani BITs’ (2012) 13 J World Investment & Trade 812.
171 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President United States,
Pakistan Begin Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations, Press Statement (28 September 2004). See eg
Shahbaz Rana, ‘Why (Not) So Serious?: US Keen to Revive Bilateral Investment Treaty’ Express Tribune
(1 August 2013); Mehtab Haider, ‘Pakistan Refuses to Accept US Model on Investment Treaty’ The
News (13 March 2015); ‘Pakistan Rejects US Draft of Investment Treaty’ Pakistan Today (13 March
2015).
172 Board of Investment Ordinance of 2001, s 9.
173 Amin Ahmed, ‘New Bilateral Investment Treaty Model’ The Dawn News (2 March 2015).
174 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23).
175 China–Pakistan FTA (n 8).
176 Ibid ch IX.
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are simultaneously in force, the overlap of their respective provisions creates a degree
of anxiety regarding the convergences and divergences of the standards of protection
available to investors under both instruments. It is also important to note that the
FTA has no retrospective application,177 and investments entered before its entry
into force are likely to be governed by the BIT provisions.178 Likewise, investments
made after the entry into force of the FTA can be governed by the FTA, the BIT, or
either of them, subject to the fulfilment of the respective criteria set out in these two
treaties.
When both the FTA and the BIT deal with the same subject matter (that is,
investments, although the FTA also deals with trade), it would be appropriate to
compare their respective provisions in order to attain a clearer view of the standards
of investment protection provided by the two instruments. The comparison will also
reveal if the FTA has enlarged or restricted the scope of BIT provisions.
Additionally, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires
every treaty and each treaty clause to be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.179 It is, therefore, important to discuss the particular language
used in different clauses of both the BIT and the FTA and its implications for invest-
ors and their investments. This will help the Chinese and Pakistani investors seeking
to rely on these treaties to better understand their rights and reducing the risk of
investment disputes.
The China–Pakistan BIT follows a standard format. The preamble sets forth the
primary objectives as ‘to encourage, protect and create favourable conditions for
investments by investors’ moving between party states. This language is different
from some other BITs, for example, when their preambles associate the need to pro-
mote and protect foreign investments ‘with the aim to foster the economic prosper-
ity’ of contracting sates.180 This latter type of objectives can possibly mean that in
order for an investment to be protected under a BIT, it must have contributed to the
development of the host State. Investor–State arbitration tribunals have interpreted
this kind of BIT preamble, in conjunction with the preamble to the ICSID
Convention, to apply this threshold for the protected investment under BITs.181
However, given the various type of language used in BIT preambles and due to the
177 Ibid art 81.
178 There is a degree of uncertainty surrounding the issue if, under VCLT (n 182) art 59, a new treaty deal-
ing with the same subject matter between the same parties impliedly terminates the earlier treaty or the
parties required to specifically give notice of termination of the earlier treaty under VCLT art 65.
However, international courts and tribunals have rejected the view of implied termination of treaties and
clarified that a notice of termination is a compulsory requirement. See Ahmad Ghouri, Interaction and
Conflict of Treaties in Investment Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2015) 164–8.
179 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (1969) (VCLT).
180 Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments (signed on 16 April 1993, entered into force on 05 November
1993). See also Romak SA v The Republic of Uzbekistan, UNCITRAL – PCA Case No AA280, Award,
26 November 2009) para 181.
181 See my analysis on this in Ghouri (n 181) 141–3. The most famous investor–State reported cases that
applied this threshold are Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Morocco, ICSID Case No ARB/00/
4, Decision on Jurisdiction (23 July 2001) and Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn Bhd v Malaysia, ICSID
Case No ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction (17 May 2007) (Malaysian Historical Salvors).
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imprecise meaning of the concept of ‘contribution to the host state’s development’,
this requirement for protected investments has remained controversial.182
The China–Pakistan FTA has more detailed objectives listed in its preamble,
including the following:
[T]his Agreement should be implemented with a view toward raising the stand-
ard of living, creating new job opportunities, and promoting sustainable develop-
ment in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation.183
This preamble statement clearly lists the objectives in plain and neat language, stat-
ing precisely what the contracting parties intend to achieve through the implementa-
tion of the FTA. Although, as will be discussed in more detail below, the FTA
defines the term investment broadly as ‘every kind of asset’,184 this broad definition
should be interpreted in light of the general objectives set forth in the preamble. In
practice, this could mean that any conceivable investment in financial or business
terms made by Chinese investors in Pakistan or vice versa will not amount to pro-
tected investment within the meaning of the FTA unless it meets the specific objec-
tive conditions listed in the preamble.
Both the BIT and the FTA define ‘investment’ as ‘every kind of asset’ invested as
investment in accordance with the laws and regulations of the contracting parties.185
For the purposes of clarity, both instruments provide a near identical non-exclusive
list as examples of possible investments, including moveable and immoveable prop-
erty, shares and other form of interest in companies, claims to money or performance,
intellectual property rights, and government concessions.186 These definitions effec-
tively cover both direct and portfolio investments. However, the BIT and the FTA
take different approaches to define the term ‘investor’. The BIT gives two different
definitions for Chinese and Pakistani investors. A Pakistani investor includes any
‘physical person’ who is a national of Pakistan or a company incorporated in Pakistan.
Whereas a Chinese investor can be any ‘natural person’ who is Chinese national or
‘economic entities’ established in China having Chinese domicile.187
This is an interesting distinction. For example, the PCICL, which was discussed
above, may be treated as neither a natural person who is a Chinese citizen nor an
economic entity established and domiciled in China and may not amount to an
investor according to this definition. However, given their wider definitions of the
term ‘investment’, the PCICL is likely to qualify as an investment under both the
BIT and the FTA. In terms of the application of protections to both investors and
182 Eg, the Malaysian Historical Salvors (n 184). The Award of Jurisdiction was subsequently annulled by an
ad hoc Annulment Committee. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn Bhd v Malaysia, ICSID Case No
ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment (16 April 2009). See also Victor Pey Casado et
Fondation ‘Presidente Allende’ c Re´publique du Chili, ICSID Case No ARB/98/2, Sentence arbitrale (8
May 2008). Omar E Garcı´a-Bolı´var, ‘Defining an ICSID Investment: Why Economic Development
Should be the Core Element’ Investment Treaty News (13 April 2012).
183 China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) preamble, para 5.
184 Ibid art 46.
185 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 1(a); China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 46(1).
186 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 1(a) I–V; China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 46 (1) (a) to (e).
187 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 1(b).
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investments, the FTA clearly states that its protections apply equally to both invest-
ments and investors.188 This is different from the BIT’s approach, which states that
‘investments and activities associated with investments of investors’ are protected.189
The BIT’s distinction between Chinese and Pakistani investors appears to be
unnecessary and misleading, and the FTA eliminates this distinction by providing
only one definition for investors belonging to both countries. The FTA defines
investors as both ‘natural persons’ who are citizens and ‘legal entities’ constituted
and have seats in a contracting party. This is a simple and better approach, which
covers all forms of business enterprises.
Both the BIT and the FTA subject the admission of investment by party States to
their respective laws and regulations.190 This necessarily means that all CPEC proj-
ects will have to go through the domestic validation procedures. If no specific valida-
tion procedures are required by Pakistani law for a particular type of investment at
the time of its entry, the validity of investment will be judged in view of its conform-
ity with local laws.191 An interesting comparison can be made between the defini-
tions of investor and investment in the BIT and the FTA with that found in the
FPIA. The FPIA conflates the terms investors and investment, and instead of defin-
ing investor it uses the term ‘foreign capital’, denoting it as an investment made by a
foreigner in an ‘industrial undertaking’ in Pakistan:
• in the form of foreign exchange, imported machinery and equipment, or
• in any other form which the Federal Government ‘may approve for the purpose’.192
The law defines ‘foreign private investment’ as an ‘investment in foreign capital by a
person who is not a citizen of Pakistan or who, being a citizen of Pakistan, is also the
citizen of any other country or by a company incorporated outside Pakistan, but does
not include investment by a foreign Government or agency of foreign Government’.193
It is clear that the law does not extend its protections to investors and protects only
investments. The law further limits the ‘industrial undertakings’ to such establishments
engaged in the production of goods or services or extractive business ‘as may be speci-
fied in this behalf by the Federal Government’194 The obvious limitation with ‘as may
be specified’ and ‘may approve for the purpose’ is that the law does not cover invest-
ments that have not been specified and approved by the federal government. This is
perhaps the reason why Pakistan did not set forth any domestic laws or regulations
providing for a specific definition of investment in the Bayindir case.195 These provi-
sions of the FPIA should be amended to align them with the investment treaties.
188 China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 47(2).
189 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 3(1).
190 Ibid art 2; China–Pakistan (n 8) art 47(1).
191 Bayindir (n 144) paras 109, 31.
192 FPIA (n 132) art 2(a).
193 Ibid art 2(b).
194 Ibid art 2(c)
195 Bayindir (n 144) paras 108, 31. It is noteworthy that although several investment treaty claims have
been brought against Pakistan, Bayindir is the only case in which a detailed and publicly available final
award has been rendered by an investor–State arbitration tribunal.
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In term of protections, the BIT requires ‘equitable treatment’ and ‘protection in
the territory of other contracting party’.196 This is not the language usually used in
most contemporary BITs, which require ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET) and
‘full protection and security’.197 The basic idea of FET is to bring the application of
‘good faith’ and ‘rule of law’ to the investor–State relationship.198 FET also works as
an overarching principle to fill any gaps left by specific standards of protection set
out by particular treaty clauses.199 The different factors that emerge from decisions
of investment tribunals as forming part of the FET standard comprise the obligation
to act transparently and grant due process, to refrain from taking arbitrary or discrim-
inatory measures, from exercising coercion, or from frustrating the investor’s reason-
able expectations with respect to the legal framework affecting the investment.200
The use of ‘equitable treatment’ instead of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ merely
reflects the evolutionary phase through which the standard has passed,201 and the
application of ‘equitable treatment’ without the prefix of ‘fair’ may bring the same
results as FET because fairness is always a precondition in any legal relationship.
Similarly, the omission of the prefix ‘full’ and the post-fix ‘and security’ is likely to
be of lesser significance because the ‘full protection and security’ standard by itself
does not place a state under an obligation to provide absolute protection.202
However, the FTA uses the fuller expression ‘fair and equitable treatment’203 and
requires ‘constant protection of and security’ for both investors and investments.204
The word ‘constant’ in place of ‘full’ for the protection and security is sensible
because the addition of ‘full’ does not obligate contracting parties to provide absolute
protection,205 whereas consistency of the applicable protection should be a necessary
condition.
The BIT does not have the ‘national treatment’ provision, which is meant to cre-
ate a level playing field between the Chinese investors and local competitors. The
BIT’s ‘no less favourable’ treatment provision is limited to the most-favoured-nation
(MFN) treatment, which ensures level playing field between investors from the BIT
parties and investors coming from third states.206 The ‘no less favourable’ standard
generally requires a host State, at the time of implementation of its rules and regula-
tions, to: (i) place foreign investors in a comparable setting as local competitors; (ii)
treat them as favourably as the local competitors; and (iii) if treatment of the foreign
196 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 3(1).
197 See eg Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law
(2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 130–2.
198 Ibid 132–4.
199 Ibid.
200 Bayindir (n 144) paras 178, 50.
201 See eg Fair and Equitable Treatment, (1999) UN Publication Sales No E.99.II.D.15, UNCTAD/ITE/
IIT/11 (Vol III) 29–31.
202 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 201) 161.
203 China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 48(1).
204 Ibid art 47(2).
205 See eg AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/87/3, Award (27 June 1990) para 48; Wena Hotels Ltd
v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, Award (8 December 2000) para 84.
206 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 3(2). See eg Noah Rubins and N Stephan Kinsella, International
Investment, Political Risk and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (Oceana Publications 2005)
225–6.
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investor is less favourable than that of local competitors, justify as to why the foreign
investor has been given the different treatment.207 The FTA, however, covers both
national treatment and MFN treatment.208 Since both national treatment and MFN
treatment standards require a comparison between a claimant foreign investor and
another local or foreign investor, investor–State arbitration tribunals assess whether
the claimant was in a ‘similar situation’ to that of other investors.209 Once a claim
has passed the ‘similar situation’ test, tribunals then inquire whether the claimant
investor was granted less favourable treatment than other investors.210 Claimant
investor has the responsibility to identify appropriate comparators who were in a
similar situation and also the burden to prove that the host State treated those com-
parators more favourably.211
Both the BIT and the FTA have the so-called Regional Economic Integration
Organization (REIO) exception to the MFN treatment.212 The REIO exception in
both treaties cover customs unions, free trade zones, and special taxation regimes.213
The FTA includes an additional REIO exception for small-scale trade in border
areas.214 The existence of an REIO depends on many factors such as mere political
commitments or formal and legally binding obligations to dismantle market access
obstacles for investors or investments coming from states forming part of an
REIO.215 The exact characteristics of an REIO are not fully established, but it con-
notes a multilateral consortium with some kind of institutional setup.216 The practi-
cal effect of an REIO exception to MFN treatment in an investment treaty (a BIT or
an investment chapter in a bilateral FTA) is that any investment concessions or other
favourable treatment allowed by party States to investors or investments coming
from their REIO partners will not be available as comparators to prove violation of
MFN treatment under the investment treaty.
Both the BIT and the FTA include provisions on expropriation.217 Although the
FTA’s expropriation clause has used a negative construction in comparison to the
BIT (that is, ‘[n]either Party shall expropriate’ in the FTA as compared to ‘[e]ither
Contracting Party may . . . expropriate’ in the BIT), the conditions imposed for
expropriation in both the BIT and the FTA are the same.218 These conditions are in
line with the international rules and allow expropriation only on the bases of public
interest, under domestic legal procedures, without discrimination, and on payment
207 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 201) 199.
208 China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 48, clauses (2) and (3).
209 Bayindir (n 144) paras 389, 114.
210 Ibid paras 390, 114.
211 Ibid paras 419, 122.
212 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 3(3); China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 48(4). On Regional Economic
Integration Organization (REIO) clauses, see eg ‘The REIO Exception in MFN Treatment Clauses’
UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development, United Nations (New York
and Geneva 2004).
213 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 3(3); China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 48(4).
214 China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 48 (4)(c).
215 See ‘The REIO Exception in MFN Treatment Clauses’ (n 216) 11.
216 Ibid.
217 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 4; China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 49.
218 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 4; China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 49.
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of compensation.219 Instead of the requirement of ‘prompt, adequate and effective’
compensation,220 the BIT requires calculation of compensation in accordance with
the laws of host State, paid in convertible currencies, and without unreasonable
delay.221 The FTA uses slightly different language and requires the compensation to
be made ‘without delay, be effectively realisable and freely transferable’.222
However, where the BIT requires the calculation of compensation in accordance
with the laws of host State, the FTA provides that the value of an expropriated prop-
erty ‘shall be determined in accordance with the generally recognised principles of
valuation’.223 Since there is no single method for valuation of claims in international
investment law, this FTA provision may produce unexpected outcomes.224 The FTA
further provides that compensation shall be equivalent to the value of expropriated
investments immediately before the expropriation or when the impending expropria-
tion becomes public knowledge, whichever is earlier.225 This compensation does not
cover the loss of the business opportunity and future profits. In case of delay in the
payment of compensation, the FTA requires payment of interest ‘at a normal com-
mercial rate’ for the period between expropriation and the actual payment of com-
pensation.226 It goes without saying that the reference to the ‘normal commercial
rate’ for the calculation of interest on unpaid compensation is susceptible to more
than one interpretation.
Pertinent to the BIT’s provision that compensation will be calculated in accord-
ance with the laws of the host State, the BIT has required unsatisfied investors to
move the competent domestic court of the host State to review whether the amount
of compensation is in accordance with the applicable domestic laws.227 There is no
equivalent provision in the FTA. Both the BIT and the FTA have a force majeure
clause.228 Both force majeure clauses are identical and cover loss arising from war,
state of emergency, insurrection, and riots; however, the clause in the FTA clarifies
that it applies to both investors and their investments and requires, as opposed to
only MFN treatment in the BIT, both national and MFN treatment in regard to res-
titution, indemnification, compensation, and other settlement.229 Similarly, both the
BIT and the FTA have near identical clauses on the free transfer of fund guaran-
tee,230 however, the provision in the FTA extends this guarantee to the
219 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 4; China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 49. See eg Andrew Newcombe and
Lluı´s Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law International
2009) 369–77.
220 See eg Peter D Isakoff, ‘Defining the Scope of Indirect Expropriation for International Investments’
(2013) 3(2) Global Business Law Revw 189, 191.
221 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 4(2).
222 China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 49(2).
223 Ibid art 49(2).
224 Eg, if the compensation will be calculated on the bases on discounted cash flow, fair/full market value,
and/or will include future lost profits.
225 China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 49(2).
226 Ibid art 49 (2).
227 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 4(3).
228 Ibid art 4(4); China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 50.
229 China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 50.
230 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 5; China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 51.
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compensation paid to an investor against expropriation or force majeure.231 Both the
BIT and the FTA have subrogation clauses by which the rights and claims of invest-
ors can be assigned to, and exercised by, their respective home states or a designated
agency.232
Both treaties have provisions on the settlement of disputes between the party
States as well as between an investor and a party State. In both treaties, the first
means for dispute resolution between party States is consultation through diplomatic
channels.233 If consultations fail to resolve the dispute within six months, disputes
between party States will be resolved through an ad hoc arbitration tribunal consist-
ing of three members, where each party will appoint one arbitrator and the two
appointed arbitrators will appoint the third arbitrator who will preside over the tribu-
nal.234 The ad hoc tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions
of the respective treaties (the BIT or the FTA) and principles of international law
recognized by both parties.235 The requirement of principles of international law
‘recognized by both parties’ is very subjective and can create friction in the absence
of specific criteria to determine if a principle is recognized by both parties. This kind
of subjective provision is likely to allow an arbitration tribunal to exercise value judg-
ment in determining the application of applicable principles of international law and
may serve as a tool for balancing private rights against the public’s interest and the
host State’s right to regulate. The tribunal shall reach its award on the basis of a
majority vote, and this award will be final and binding upon the parties.236
The investor–State dispute resolution provision in the BIT has a very narrow
scope.237 It is restricted to disputes involving the amount of compensation for expro-
priation and does not cover any other violations of the standards of treatment pro-
vided in the BIT. An investor can file a complaint with a competent authority of the
expropriating State to challenge the amount of compensation paid for expropriation.
If such a complaint is not resolved within a year, the investor can take the dispute to
the competent domestic court of the host State or to an international arbitral tribu-
nal.238 The BIT does not provide any details on the formation and procedures of the
international arbitral tribunal or the law such a tribunal will apply.
As compared to the BIT, the FTA contains a more detailed clause on investor–
State dispute resolution.239 The FTA extends the application of the investor–State
dispute resolution provision to ‘any legal dispute’ that is ‘in connection with an
investment’.240 The first step for dispute resolution is negotiations between disputing
parties, and if negotiations do not resolve the dispute within six months, the investor
can choose to take the dispute to the domestic court of the host State or to
231 China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 51(2).
232 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 7; China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 52.
233 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23), art 9(1); China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 53(1).
234 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 9; China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 53.
235 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 9(5); China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 53(5).
236 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 9(5); China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 53(6).
237 China–Pakistan BIT (n 23) art 10.
238 Ibid.
239 China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 54.
240 Ibid art 54(1).
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International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).241 The choice
of ICSID is subject to any domestic administrative review procedures specified by
the laws and regulations of the host State.242 The FTA further provides that once
the investor has submitted the dispute to the competent domestic court of the host
State or to ICSID, the choice of the forum shall be final.243 This is an interesting pro-
vision as typical investor–State dispute resolution provisions in investment treaties
allow parallel proceedings before domestic courts of host States and international
arbitration.244 By limiting the investors’ choice to only one of these at a time, the
FTA has effectively pre-empted possible conflicting outcomes from the two separate
decision-making bodies. The choice of ICSID in the FTA as the only forum for inter-
national arbitration appears to be unnecessarily restrictive. However, since there is
no similar arbitration centre present in the region, ICSID appears to be the only sen-
sible option.
The FTA further requires that the arbitration award shall be based on the domes-
tic law of the host State including rules on the conflict of laws, the provisions of the
FTA, and the ‘universally accepted principles of international law’.245 The application
of universally accepted principles of international law is meant to ensure that the
investors’ rights are protected in accordance with the most civilized standards of
treatment that exist in international law, although they may not have formed part of
the FTA or have not been legislated domestically by the party States. This is also in
sharp contrast with the earlier-mentioned BIT’s requirement of principles of interna-
tional law recognized by party States. Although what would be universally acceptable
principles of international law is also highly subjective, it reflects a move away from
the individual or regional notions of international law principles and towards the
main stream universalism.
The FTA also contains an ‘umbrella clause’ requiring contracting States to
observe the commitments they have made with investors of the other party in regard
to their investments.246 This provision serves to bring independent contracts made
by a party State with investors from another party State under the umbrella of the
FTA’s protections. A breach of such contract will be treated as a breach of the FTA,
allowing investors to use the dispute resolution provisions of the FTA.
The combination of the FTA and the BIT provide the most modern and compre-
hensive bilateral regime for the protection of Chinese investments in Pakistan. The
241 Ibid art 54(2).
242 Ibid art 54(2) (b).
243 Ibid art 54.
244 See eg Agreement between the Government of the Australia and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (entered into
force on 14 October 1998) arts 13 and 14; Agreement between the Government of the United
Kingdom and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investment (entered into force on 30 November 1994) art 8. The FTA’s restriction is
comparable with the investor–State dispute resolution provision in the Pakistan–-Japan BIT, which does
not allow investors to initiate international arbitration until the final judicial settlement of dispute by
domestic court of the host state. See Agreement between the Government of Japan and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment (entered into force on 29 May 2002) art 10(3).
245 China–Pakistan FTA (n 8) art 54(3).
246 Ibid art 55(2).
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standards of protection are in line with the international rules, however, since both
treaties subject the creation of investments to domestic laws of the host State, the
CPEC projects will have to go through the domestic validation procedures in order
to qualify as investments within the scope of protections offered by the treaties.
Although there is a need to create local arbitration institution, the FTA and the BIT
create a bilateral investment regime befitting the deep-rooted economic ties between
the two countries.
CONCLUSIONS
The detailed SREB Action Plan has clarified that the SREB is intended to guide the
entire region into a new era of cooperation and economic development. The broader
legitimacy of the project is ensured through the cautious commitment that the SREB
rules of engagement will follow the principles of international law. The commitment
to a balanced development of the different parts of the SREB involving both long-
time friends, such as Pakistan, and yet to be tested partners, such as India, shows the
Chinese government’s commitment to take particular perceptions and viewpoints of
all stakeholders on board. This could effectively mean that different parts of the
SREB will evolve at a different pace depending on the particular partners requiring a
continued commitment of the Chinese government to the project. However, where
the SREB has a larger regional impact, its offspring, the SPEC, has special impor-
tance for both Pakistan and China, and both countries need to develop a collective
strategy to address Indian concerns in order to enhance the greater legitimacy and
integrity of the project.
The SREB’s market-based approach to regional integration is quite innovative
and is well suited for regional partners that have many differences in their govern-
ment systems, social structures, and legal ideologies. The SREB initiative is based on
economic development through trade instead of aid and long-term investments
through commercial enterprises, and it clearly has the potential to bring more sus-
tainable development. These innovative approaches reflect new models of interna-
tional cooperation and global governance to achieve common ideals. The SREB will
enable partner countries to learn from each other’s experiences and to devise collec-
tive strategies to fulfil mutual economic and development needs. The increased
regional economic integration and interdependency will promote mutual trust and
the ability to produce a collective response to global economic challenges.
Where the SREB initiative is largely conducive to the economic needs of partici-
pating states, there are a number of issues that need to be addressed in order to earn
the broader socio-legal cogency. In the context of the CPEC, for example, there is a
need to bring more transparency and public debate, to ensure the fair distribution of
benefits of the project and proper enforcement of labour standards and to have effec-
tive laws and procedures in place to pre-empt corrupt practices of corporate and gov-
ernment officials. The reference to social responsibility of corporations in the SREB
Action Plan is a good initiative; however, effective laws and procedures for the
enforcement of this cross-border corporate responsibility need to be incorporated
into the domestic legal systems. Overall, the relations among all SREB partners
should be based on mutual trust, ensuring that the large-scale Chinese investments
set a path to improve governance, transparency and the effective rule of law, and
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strengthened property rights. If this is not done, China’s economic presence is likely
to be viewed as a dominating device in the longer run.
Investments by Chinese companies in Pakistan cover a variety of sectors and will
adapt to different legal and transactional formats suitable to the kind of investments
made, depending upon whether the investor is a private or a state-owned company
and the nature of the projects. The CPEC will bring a new wave of Chinese invest-
ment in Pakistan, and a solid domestic regime of foreign investment governance is
imperative to satisfy both the legitimacy (that is, through proper implementation of
domestic validating rules and procedures) and success (that is, through proper defi-
nition and allocation of rights and responsibilities) of foreign investments. Pakistan
has well-defined and fairly modern national investment laws that provide adequate
protection to foreign investors. The Pakistani law requires expropriation to follow
the due process of law and against the payment of adequate compensation. In the
case of expropriation, the rights of third parties and creditors are protected under the
law. The law requires non-discrimination and no less favourable treatment to foreign
investors. The reacquisition of privatized government companies is expressly prohib-
ited even for a public purpose. The higher courts in Pakistan are competent to enter-
tain and enforce any breaches of these laws; however, there is a need to build the
confidence of foreign investors in the domestic courts.
Other forms of dispute resolution, such as arbitration, are also available to foreign
investors under the Pakistani laws, although there is no established arbitration insti-
tute in Pakistan to provide administrative support to disputing parties willing to arbi-
trate. The recent cases decided by Pakistani courts suggest that courts are now
willing to enforce foreign arbitration agreements between private parties more aptly
than before. The new legislation implementing the New York Convention and the
ICSID Convention in Pakistan have brought certainty to the enforcement of arbitral
awards in Pakistan. However, in anticipation of a rapid increase in the volume of
Chinese investments in Pakistan after the implementation of the CPEC and also to
facilitate existing investments, the two countries should consider establishing a joint
arbitration centre. Pakistan also has a modern IP regime in place, but the enforce-
ment infrastructure has not yet been created, which will potentially discourage some
foreign investors.
The two countries have put a fairly strong bilateral investment regime in place
with the BIT and a chapter on investments in the FTA. The BIT and the FTA have
many similar provisions, however, the language used in the FTA reflects the most
recent jurisprudence of investor protection. For example, the FTA uses the fuller
expression of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ in comparison to the BIT, which merely
requires ‘equitable treatment’. The FTA has also covered gaps in the BIT’s provisions
on the treatment of investors, for example, by providing both national treatment and
MFN treatment as opposed to the BIT’s only MFN treatment. There is also signifi-
cant variation in the language of provisions on expropriation where a negative con-
struction in the FTA appears to discourage expropriation. The FTA also requires the
calculation of compensation for expropriation in accordance with ‘generally recog-
nised principles of valuation’ as opposed to the BIT, which allows calculation accord-
ing to the domestic laws of the host State. However, the reference to ‘generally
recognised principles of valuation’ in the FTA is subject to interpretation as there is
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no standard or unified principle of calculation of compensation in international law.
The same problem may arise with respect to the FTA’s provision on interest on the
unpaid compensation, which requires the calculation of interest at a ‘normal com-
mercial rate’.
Compared to the BIT, the FTA has more extensive and modern provisions on
investor–State dispute settlements covering any legal dispute in connection with an
investment. The FTA allows a dispute to proceed directly to international arbitration
without requiring exhaustion of local remedies. However, the FTA does not allow
parallel proceedings before domestic courts and international arbitration preventing
possibly opposing outcomes from the two different avenues. The choice of ICSID as
an arbitration centre is both restrictive and unwieldy as the two countries should
endeavour to develop local capacities and create regional centres for international
arbitration.
Overall, the SREB initiative has great potential for the entire region and will bring
the participating countries closer than ever. It provides a great opportunity for the
participating countries to resolve their existing differences and join hands with China
to strive for the total development of the entire region. The earlier-mentioned chal-
lenges, regardless if they are purely political or legal in their nature, are certainly
manageable. A careful re-evaluation of the SREB Action Plan is required in order to
reflect the awareness of these challenges and to display a broader vision and determi-
nation to address them. The Chinese ‘go global’ policy will remain unrewarding both
socially and economically in the long run if Chinese domestic legal structures are not
tuned to cope with the problems of a global and transnational nature. Building trans-
national roads and infrastructures must go hand in hand with the development of
sophisticated and effective rights enforcement mechanisms at both the national and
transnational levels.
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